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I. INTRODUCTION
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)'
was enacted "to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans."2 Both employer-provided pension
and welfare benefits are protected under the Act.3 As part of ERISA's
comprehensive benefit protections, section 510 protects an employee
against an employer's interference with the attainment of rights
under a benefit plan or the Act as well as an employer's retaliation for
exercising rights under a benefit plan or the Act.4 Section 510
provides:
*

**

1.
2.
3.
4.
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See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1)-(2), 1003 (1988).
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 510,29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
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It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any
right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan,
[or] this subchapter, ... or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment
of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan,
[or] this subchapter.... It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine,
suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against any person because he has
given information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this chapter .... 5

The section 5026 civil enforcement provisions are applicable when a
section 510 claim is brought.
The right to jury trial is a frequently litigated issue in ERISA actions.7 In fact, litigants have continued to rehash arguments concerning the existence of a right to trial by jury on section 510 claims since
the statute was enacted. Until 1992, courts regularly disagreed in
their results regarding whether and when the right arises. 8 More re5. Id.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
7. See, e.g., Spinelli v. Gaughan, 12 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 1993); Blake v. Unionmutual
Stock Life Ins. Co. of Am., 906 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1990); Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 894 F.2d 647 (3d Cir.) (Cox I), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990); Cox v.
Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1988) (Cox I); Katsaros v. Cody, 744
F.2d 270 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984); In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318
(8th Cir. 1982); Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980); Wardle v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981); Zimmerman v. Sloss Equip., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1283
(D. Kan. 1993); Pickering v. USX Corp., 809 F. Supp. 1501 (D. Utah 1992);
Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 804 F. Supp. 931 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Abels v.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 803 F. Supp. 1151 (S.D. W. Va. 1992); Pegg v.
General Motors Corp., 793 F. Supp. 284 (D. Kan. 1992); Vicinanzo v. Brunschwig
& Fils, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Gangitano v. NN Investors Life
Ins. Co., 733 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Haeffele v. Hercules Inc., 703 F. Supp.
326 (D. Del. 1989); Chastain v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Ga.
1980); Stamps v. Mich. Teamsters Joint Council No. 43, 431 F. Supp. 745 (E.D.
Mich. 1977).
8. For examples of cases holding that no right to a jury trial attaches, see Spinelli v.
Gaughan, 12 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 1993); Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co.
of Am., 906 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1990); In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318 (8th Cir.
1982); Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980); Wardle v. Central
States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981); Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 894 F.2d 647 (3d Cir.)
(Cox I1), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990); Pickering v. USX Corp., 809 F. Supp.
1501 (D. Utah 1992); Haeffele v. Hercules, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 326 (D. Del. 1989);
Chastain v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Tucker v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 86-C-9734, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6737 (N.D. ill.
July 16, 1987); Brill v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, No. 82-C7973, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (N.D. M11.
July 31, 1986).
For examples of cases holding that a right to jury trial does exist, see International Union v. Midland Steel Prod. Co., 771 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Blue
Cross & Blue Shield v. Lewis, 753 F. Supp. 345 (N.D. Ala. 1990); Weber v. Jacobs
Mfg. Co., 751 F. Supp. 21 (D. Conn. 1990); Vicinanzo v. Bruschwig & Fils, Inc.,
739 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Gangitano v. N.N. Investors Life Ins. Co., 733
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cently, however, most courts addressing the issue seem to be following
a trend away from finding the existence of the right. 9 The Supreme
Court has provided no direct guidance on the issue.1 0
This Article analyzes whether a right to jury trial exists for an ERISA section 510 interference and retaliation action. The Article first
focuses on whether Congress explicitly or implicitly provided the right
under the statute itself, and concludes that no right is explicitly provided. In addition, a plain reading of ERISA enforcement sections
502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(3) and an analysis of the legislative history
indicate that Congress intended for section 510 actions to be enforced
only under section 502(a)(3) and that an implicit right to a jury trial
was not provided in that section. Because no explicit or implicit statutory right exists, the Article goes on to analyze the issue under the
United States Supreme's Court's Ross v. Bernhardll Seventh Amendment right to jury trial test and highlights the most recent cases addressing this issue. The Article ultimately concludes that no right to a
jury trial attaches under the Seventh Amendment because a plain
reading of enforcement section 502(a)(3) indicates that only equitable
remedies are available to enforce a section 510 claim.
II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has held that a court should
"first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible
by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided."12 Courts
must examine ERISA's language to determine whether Congress explicitly provided for the right to a jury trial. Then, if the right was not
explicitly provided, courts must review the statutory language and,
legislative history for clues regarding Congress' intent to include an
implicit right to jury trial.

9.
10.

11.
12.

F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Stamps v. Michigan Teamsters Joint Council No.
43, 431 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
For opinions that have been interpreted to allow a jury trial depending on the
remedy requested, see, e.g., Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1072 (1984); Steeples v. Time Ins. Co., 139 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Okla. 1991).
See, e.g., Spinelli v. Gaughan, 12 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 1993); Zimmerman v. Sloss
Equip., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1283 (D. Kan. 1993).
In fact, the Third and Ninth Circuits are the only circuit courts to directly address the issue in the context of an ERISA § 510 claim. Spinelli v. Gaughan, 12
F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 1993); Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 894 F.2d 647 (3d Cir.) (Cox
II), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990); Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390
(3d Cir. 1988) (Cox I).
396 U.S. 531 (1970).
See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 n.3
(1990) (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 n.6 (1974) (quoting United
States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971), reh'g denied, 403
U.S. 924 (1971))).
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A. ERISA's Explicit Language
The right to a jury trial is explicitly provided when a statute's language actually states that such a right is available. For example, Congress recently provided an explicit right to a jury trial when a plaintiff
requess compensatory and punitive damages in a Title VII action.13
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 specifically states that "any party may
demand a trial by jury"1 4 when the complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages.15
No such explicit language exists in ERISA. Although a number of
section 502(a) subsections are available to enforce an ERISA claim,
only subsections 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(3) are potentially appropriate
for the enforcement of a section 510 action.16 Subsection 502(a)(1)(B)
provides that an employee benefit plan participant may bring a civil
action "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan."'17 Subsection 502(a)(3)

provides that a participant may "enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or...
obtain other equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan."18
Clearly, neither of these subsections provides an explicit right to jury
trial; they merely provide a cause of action to plan participants or beneficiaries. Courts, therefore, have repeatedly faced the question of
whether an implicit right exists.
B. An Implicit Right
Whether Congress implicitly provided a right to jury trial under
ERISA is a much more subjective and controversial inquiry than determining whether the right was explicitly provided. Although the
13. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
14. Id. (emphasis added).
15. Id. See also Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1988)
(providing that "a person shall be entitled to a trialbyjury of any issue of fact...
regardless of whether equitable relief is sought... .") (emphasis added).
16. Section 502(a)(1)(A) applies only when an administrator fails to supply information requested by a participant or beneficiary or fails to file complete annual reports. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(A),(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Subsection 502(a)(2)
applies only when the case involves liability for the breach of a fiduciary duty. Id.
§§ 1109, 1132(a)(2). Subsection 502(a)(4) applies when the plan administrator
fails to provide summary plan descriptions to each participant. Id. §§ 1025(c),
1132(a)(4). Subsections 502(a)(5)-(6) apply only when an action is brought by the
Secretary. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5)-(6) (1988).
None of these § 502(a) subsections are appropriate for an interference with
benefits claim under § 510. Therefore, only subsections 502(a)(1)(B) and (a)(3)
are potentially applicable.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988).

18. Id. § 1132(a)(3).
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courts seem to agree that subsection 502(a)(3) is available for enforcement of a section 510 claim, they disagree about the applicability of
subsection 502(a)(1)(B).19 Further, those courts that believe subsection 502(a)(1)(B) may be used to enforce section 510 still disagree
about Congress' intent to provide a right to jury trial under -hat section.20 A plain reading and comparison of subsections 502(a)(1)(B)
and 502(a)(3), however, support the conclusion that section 510 claims
are enforceable only pursuant to subsection 502(a)(3).
Subsection 502(a)(1)(B) consistently refers to recovery of benefits
or enforcement of rights provided by the "terms of the plan."2 1 Section
3(3) defines the term "plan" as meaning an employee welfare benefit
plan, employee pension benefit plan, and a plan that provides both
19. See, e.g., Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 894 F.2d 647 (3d Cir.) (Cox II), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 811 (1990) (stating that either subsection may be used to enforce the
right, but ultimately holding that no right to jury trial exists); International
Union v. Midland Steel Prod. Co., 771 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (maintaining that either subsection may be used to enforce the right and finding that a
right to jury trial is implicit under the Act); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v.
Lewis, 753 F. Supp. 345 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (finding that either subsection may be
used to enforce the right and holding that a right to jury trial attaches under the
Seventh Amendment); Weber v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 751 F. Supp. 21 (D. Conn. 1990)
(stating that either subsection may be used to enforce the right and a right to jury
trial exists under the Seventh Amendment); Vicinanzo v. Brunschwig & Fils,
Inc., 739 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (claiming that either subsection may be
used to enforce section 510 and Congress implicitly provided a right to jury trial);
Tucker v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 86-C-9734, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6737
(N.D. Ill. July 16, 1987) (limiting enforcement to subsection 502(a)(3) and concluding that no right to jury trial exists); Brill v. Central States, S.E. & S.W.
Areas Pension Fund, No. 82-C-7973, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (N.D. IM. July 31,
1986) (limiting enforcement to subsection 502(a)(3) and holding that no right to
jury trial attaches).
20. For examples of cases holding that no right to a jury trial attaches under
§ 502(a)(1)(B), see Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co. of Am., 906 F.2d
1525 (11th Cir. 1990); Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 894 F.2d 647 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990); In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1982); Calamia
v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980); Wardle v. Central States, S.E. & S.W.
Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112
(1981); Pegg v. General Motors Corp., 793 F. Supp. 284 (D. Kan. 1992).
For examples of cases holding that a right to jury trial does exist, see International Union v. Midland Steel Prod. Co., 771 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Lewis, 753 F. Supp. 345 (N.D. Ala. 1990); Weber v.
Jacobs Mfg. Co., 751 F. Supp. 21 (D. Conn. 1990); Gangitano v. NN Investors Life
Ins. Co., 733 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Vicinanzo v. Bruschwig & Fils, Inc.,
739 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Stamps v. Michigan Teamsters Joint Council
No. 43, 431 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
For an opinion that has been interpreted to allow a jury trial depending on the
remedy requested, see, e.g., Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270 (2d Cir.), cert.denied,
469 U.S. 1072 (1984).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988) (providing that the participant may "recover benefits due to him under the "terms of the plan, enforce his rights under terms of the
plan, or clarify his right to future benefits under the terms of the plan.") (emphasis added).
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welfare and pension benefits. 22 Subsection 502(a)(1)(B) does not include or refer to rights provided under the Act; it refers only to rights
provided by the employee benefit plan itself.23 Rights provided by a

source other than the terms of the plan logically do not fall within
subsecffon 502(a)(1)(B)'s reach. Therefore, rights provided only by the
Act are not enforceable under subsection 502(a)(1)(B).
Subsection 502(a)(3), on the other hand, refers to acts or practices
that "violate any provision of this subchapteror the terms of the plan"
and to enforcement of rights provided under "this subchapter or the
terms of the plan."24 Subsection 502(a)(3), when read literally, is the

only subsection available for enforcement because a violation of section 510 is more appropriately a violation of the Act-"this subchapter"-than the terms of a specific plan.25

In the 1990 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon26 decision, the
United States Supreme Court analyzed whether ERISA section 510
preempted a state common-law claim for wrongful discharge. The
Court primarily focused on the enforcement mechanism for a section
510 claim-subsection 502(a)(3).2 7 The opinion did not discuss or
even mention subsection 502(a)(1)(B) as a possible enforcement mechanism. Indeed, no language from subsection 502(a)(1)(B) is cited in
the opinion. 28
There are procedural differences between subsections 502(a)(1)(B)
and 502(a)(3) that may provide further, important insight into Congress' intent. In subsection 502(e)(1), Congress conferred jurisdiction
on both state and federal courts for claims brought under subsection
502(a)(1)(B), but it reserved jurisdiction to the federal courts for subsection 502(a)(3) suits.2 9 ERISA's legislative history indicates that

the decision to reserve jurisdiction was purposeful and deliberate.
The decision was made because subsection 502(a)(3) suits enforce the
22. Id. § 1002(3).
23. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
24. Id. § 1132(a)(3) (emphasis added).
25. See also Kross v. Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1244 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating
that § 502(a)(3) authorizes civil action for a violation of § 510); Grywczynski v.
Shasta Beverages, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 61, 64 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (holding that intraplan remedies are not adequate for violations of § 510).
Section 510 states that "Itihe provisions of section 1132 of this title shall be
applicable." 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988) (emphasis added). It might be argued that
because the plural form of the term "provision" was used, Congress intended
more than one of the § 502(a) enforcement subsections to be applicable. This argument, however, should fail because there are several "provisions" within § 502
that are "applicable" in the enforcement of a § 510 claim, including § 502(a)(3),
(e), (f), and (g). Section 510 does not refer to the specific § 502(a) "provisions"; it
refers to the more general and inclusive § 502 "provisions."
26. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
27. Id. at 142-45.

28. Id.
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1988).
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substantive rights provided by ERISA,30 and Congress was concerned
that state courts unsympathetic to ERISA might undercut the federal
minimum standards by narrowly construing the statute. 3 ' The careful thought and calculation that went into such a procedural decision
supports the conclusion that Congress wanted section 510 claimas to be
enforced under subsection 502(a)(3) only. Further, when the' United
States Supreme Court in McClendon referred to subsection 502(a)(3)
as the only enforcement mechanism for section 510 claims, it also held
that subsection 502(e)(1) applied to the subsection 502(a)(3) enforcement process and limited section 510 claim jurisdiction to the federal
courts.

3 2

In addition, Congress limited the remedies available for violations
of the Act itself-"this subchapter."33 Subsection 502(a)(3) provides
for an injunction or other forms of equitable relief.34 Congress is
aware of the difference between characterizing relief as legal or equitable.35 It chose to provide equitable relief, and such equitable relief
is traditionally awarded by the court, not a jury.
Because Congress specifically chose the words for subsection
502(a)(3) with full knowledge that claims arising under the Act-"this
subchapter"36-would be brought only in federal court and only equitable relief would be available for the claims, Congress presumably
was also aware that the right it created in section 510 would be enforced under subsection 502(a)(3). A comparison of the language used
in subsections 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(3) and ERISA's legislative history regarding the procedural differences between the subsections indicate that Congress did not intend to provide an implicit right to a
jury trial for section 510 claims.37
Even though the language and legislative history do not appear to
provide an implicit right, the United States District Court for the
30. See H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 5038,
5107; 120 CONG. REC. 29,933 (1974) (statement of Senator Williams).
31. See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity,90 HARv. L. REv. 1105, 1119-20 (1977).
32. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 145 (1990).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988).
34. Id.
35. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583 (1978).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988).
37. In both Brill v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, No. 82-C-7973,
1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (N.D. Ill. July 31, 1986), and Tucker v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., No. 86-C-9734, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6737, at *1-3 (N.D. Ill. July 16,
1987), the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois stated
that the substantive rights established in § 510 are enforceable only pursuant to
§ 502(a)(3). Relying on ERISA's plain language and the Seventh Circuit's similar
interpretation of the language and ultimate decision in Wardle v. Central States,
S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 829-30 (7th Cir. 1980), the court
in Tucker found that Congress did not explicitly or implicitly provide a right to
jury trial for a § 510 claim.
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Northern District of Ohio came to a different conclusion in International Union v. Midland Steel Products Co.38 The court decided that
either subsection 502(a)(1)(B) or 502(a)(3) could be used to enforce section 510, claims,3 9 and held that Congress implicitly provided a right
to jury.rial under ERISA.40 The court reasoned that because section
510 claims are contractual in nature and legal remedies are available,
subsection 502(a)(1)(B) could be used in addition to subsection
502(a)(3) to enforce section 510 claims. 41 In support of this conclusion,
the court relied on dicta in the Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon4 2 decision. It also looked at the Act's legislative history and decided that a
reference to section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947 (LMRA)43 meant a right to jury trial was implied under ERISA.44 Finally, the court supported this conclusion by relying on the
1990 United States Supreme Court decision in Chauffeurs, Teamsters
& Helpers, Local 391 v. Terry4 5-a Seventh Amendment case. 4 6
Although thorough, the court's analysis is not as compelling as it
may seem at first glance. The court in Midland stated that "jurytrials
are not precluded by the language of the statute."4 7 Stating that the
right is not precluded or prohibited, however, does not necessarily
mean that the right is affirmatively, or even implicitly, provided.
Moreover, the court's reliance on McClendon, one reference to LMRA
section 301, and Terry is suspect.
McClendon dealt with preemption of state law claims by ERISA
section 510-not the right to a jury trial.48 In McClendon, the plaintiff brought a wrongful discharge claim in Texas state court alleging
that his employer fired him to avoid making contributions to his pension fund.4 9 He sought compensatory and punitive damages under
various tort and contract theories.50 The district court granted the
employer's motion for summary judgment based on Texas' adherence
to the employment-at-will doctrine.51 The Texas Supreme Court,
however, reversed and concluded that a wrongful discharge claim was
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

771 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
Id. at 864.
Id.
Id.
498 U.S. 133 (1990).
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
International Union v. Midland Steel Prod. Co., 771 F. Supp. 860, 863 (N.D. Ohio

1991).
45. 494 U.S. 558 (1990).

46. International Union v. Midland Steel Prod. Co., 771 F. Supp. 860, 865 (N.D. Ohio
1991).

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
Id. at 135.
Id.
Id.
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supported by public policy because "the state has an interest in protecting employees' interests in pension plans."52 The court stated that
a plaintiff could recover in a Texas wrongful discharge action if "the
principal reason for his termination was the employer's desire to avoid
contributing to or paying benefits under the employer'sr pension
fund."53 Although federal courts had held that similar cases were preempted by ERISA, the Texas Supreme Court attempted to distinguish
McClendon's action because instead of seeking lost pension benefits,
he sought future lost wages, compensation for mental anguish, and
punitive damages.54 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because the preemption issue had divided both state and federal
courts.5 5
The court in Midland focused on one sentence in the McClendon
opinion to support its conclusion that plaintiffs could obtain legal relief under subsection 502(a)(1)(B) for a violation of section 510.56 At
the end of its opinion in McClendon, the Court stated "the relief requested here is well within the power of the federal courts to provide."57 The court in Midland understood this to mean that federal
courts could provide the exact remedy McClendon had requested-future lost wages, compensation for mental anguish, and punitive damages-in an ERISA section 510 action.5 8 Because these are legal
remedies, the court in Midland concluded that the United States
Supreme Court had put its stamp of approval on allowing such remedies for section 510 claims, thereby also allowing enforcement actions
to be brought under subsection 502(a)(1)(B).59
Given the rest of the McClendon opinion, however, such a conclusion requires a leap in logic. First, the sentence that the court relied
on must be read in context. The Texas Supreme Court had stated that
ERISA actions were concerned only with lost pension benefits.60 The
sentence immediately preceding the Midland court's quote states
"there is no basis in § 502(a)'s language for limiting ERISA actions to
only those which seek 'pension benefits.' "61 The Court in McClendon
may have been merely emphasizing that in contrast to limiting ER52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

60.
61.

McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69, 71 (Tex. 1989).
Id.
Id.
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 136 (1990).
International Union v. Midland Steel Prod. Co., 771 F. Supp. 860, 864 (N.D. Ohio
1991).
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 145 (1990).
International Union v. Midland Steel Prod. Co., 771 F. Supp. 860, 863-64 (N.D.
Ohio 1991).
Id. at 864. The court could not conclude that legal relief is available under
§ 502(a)(3) because the explicit language in that subsection limits recovery to an
injunction or other "equitable" relief. See infra text accompanying note 153.
McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69, 71 n.3 (Tex. 1989).
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 145 (1990).
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ISA's coverage to pension plan benefits, a variety of remedies, including an injunction, reinstatement, lost benefits, and restoration of
seniority are available for section 510 violations-not necessarily
those specifically listed in the case. The Court could have better chosen its words, but it probably did not consider the broad reading that
lower courts would give to its words.
In Midland, the court took the words in McClendon literally.62
The sentence relied upon, however, appears at the very end of the
Court's opinion and is not part of its primary argument for allowing
preemption. 63 The sentence is dicta and should not be regarded as the
gospel on the availability of specific, legal remedies for section 510
claims.
Moreover, as discussed previously,6 4 one of the primary arguments
supporting the Court's preemption decision in McClendon focused on
ERISA's civil enforcement mechanism-subsection 502(a).6 5 McClendon specifically dealt with section 510 and the Court focused not only
on subsection 502(a)(3) as the appropriate enforcement mechanism for
such actions, but also referred to subsection 502(e)(1) which limits
subsection 502(a)(3) jurisdiction to the federal courts. 66 The Court
held only that section 510 claims are not within a state court's jurisdiction. 6 7 The Court did not discuss or even cite subsection
502(a)(1)(1). If section 510 claims are allowed under subsection
502(a)(1)(B), then subsection 502(e)(1) would have allowed state court
jurisdiction. 68 This is obviously not the case. The Court's holding in
McClendon actually supports the argument that section 510 actions
may only be brought under subsection 502(a)(3). 69
In addition to relying on one sentence in the McClendon opinion,
the court in Midland focused on ERISA's legislative history to support
its conclusion that Congress implicitly provided a right to jury trial.70
The court, however, discussed only one remark from the conference
committee ieport.71 The report stated that all civil actions "in Federal
or State courts are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the
United States in similar fashion to those brought under section 301 of
62. International Union v. Midland Steel Prod. Co., 771 F. Supp. 860, 864 (N.D. Ohio

1991).
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 145 (1990).
See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 143 (1990).
Id.
Id. at 145.
Section 502(e)(1) grants exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts except when
an action is brought under § 502(a)(1)(B). Actions under § 502(a)(1)(B) may be
brought in either state or federal court. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (1988).
69. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 145 (1990).
70. International Union v. Midland Steel Prod. Co., 771 F. Supp. 860, 863 (N.D. Ohio
1991).
71. Id.
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the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947."72 The court in Midland interpreted the report's remark by relying on a recent United
States Supreme Court decision, Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers,Local 391 v. Terry73-a Seventh Amendment case.7 4
In Terry, the Supreme Court held that a right to jury trialtexisted
under the Seventh Amendment when a plaintiff brought a breach of
duty of fair representation claim under LMRA section 301.75 However

the court's reliance, in Midland, on a 1990 case to interpret the intent
of the 1974 Congress is highly unusual. The key to determining
whether Congress implicitly provided a right to a jury trial is dependent upon its intent at the time ERISA was passed, not events that
occurred subsequent to the Act's passage. Presumably, the 1974 Congress did not have a crystal ball into which it gazed to determine that
a breach of the duty of fair representation suit would entitle parties to
a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. Moreover, the Supreme
Court specifically stated that the LMRA did not explicitly or implicitly
provide for the right to jury trial.76 For this reason, the Supreme
Court had to address the constitutional issue instead of merely relying
on the LMRA statutory language.77 The idea that the 1974 Congress
considered such a result under the Seventh Amendment and, therefore, implicitly provided a right to jury trial under ERISA section 510
is difficult to believe.
In addition, a closer look at LMRA section 301 and remarks made
by legislators shows that the 1974 Congress merely intended that certain suits under ERISA section 502 be governed by federal law, not
state law.7 8 The analogy between ERISA and the LMRA has been

limited to preemption cases because ERISA's legislative history does
not provide any indication that Congress intended to supply procedural specifics, like the right to jury trial, for such actions. In Mid72. H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 5038,
5107, and in 3 SUBCOM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC
WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RErIE-

YmNT ACT OF 1974, at 4277, 4594 (1976).
73. 494 U.S. 558 (1990).
74. International Union v. Midland Steel Prod. Co., 771 F. Supp. 860, 863 (N.D. Ohio
1991).
75. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 573 (1990).
76. Id. at 565 n.3.
77. Id. at 564-65.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988). Indeed, Senator Javits, one of ERISA's primary sponsors,
emphasized that courts would need to develop "a body of Federal substantive
law." 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974). See also Haeffele v. Hercules Inc., 703 F.
Supp. 326, 329 (D. Del. 1989) (stating that reference to LMRA merely indicates
that ERISA provisions should be governed by federal common law); Note, The
Right to Jury Trial in Enforcement Actions Under Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA,
96 HARv. L. REv. 737, 741 n.35, 742 (1983) (discussing other similar remarks
made by ERISA sponsors).
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land, the court's reliance on one conference committee report
remark 79 that is anything but clear does not support its conclusion
that Congress intended to provide an implicit right to jury trial.
Since the Midland decision in 1991, numerous other courts have
discussed the Supreme Court's dicta in McClendon and reached differing conclusions. This post-McClendon confusion exhibited by the
lower courts has touched not only cases involving claims brought
under ERISA section 510, but also those brought directly under subsection 502(a) for denial of benefits. The cases dealing with the existence of a right to trial by jury in subsection 502(a) benefits claims are
relevant to a discussion of the right to a jury trial in a section 510
claim because both types of claims share the enforcement mechanism
in subsection 502(a).
In Steeples v. Time Insurance Co.,80 the district court held that employees were entitled to a jury trial on their subsection 502(a)(1)(B)
claim for failure to pay benefits on a medical policy.8l Although Stee-

ples concerned an employer's alleged failure to pay insurance benefits,
the court relied on the district court opinions in Vicinanzo v.
Brunschwig & Fils, Inc.,8 2 and Weber v. Jacobs Manufacturing Co.,83
cases brought under section 510 for wrongful interference with benefits, to reach its holding that ERISA subsection 502(a)(1)(B) provides a
right to jury trial.84
More recently, the district court in Roberts v. Thorn Apple Valley,
Inc.8 5 sought to interpret the Supreme Court's McClendon dicta in deciding whether an ERISA section 510 claim could support an award of
punitive damages.8 6 The court in Roberts concluded that the Court's
language in McClendon was simply "responding to the Texas Supreme
Court's conclusion that a claim for relief for wrongful discharge does
not fall under ERISA."87 In other words,
79. H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA-N. 5038,
5107, and in 3 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE CoMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLC
WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIRE-

mENT ACT OF 1974, at 4277, 4594 (1976).
139 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Okla. 1991).
Id. at 694.
739 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
751 F. Supp. 21 (D. Conn. 1990).
139 F.R.D. 688, 694 (N.D. Okla. 1991).
784 F. Supp. 1538 (D. Utah 1992).
Id. at 1540-41. The question of whether punitive damages are available for section 510 claims based on wrongful interference with benefits is an issue that is
closely related to the right to jury trial question. Both issues depend upon an
interpretation of the remedies provided by Congress in ERISA § 502(a) and the
Supreme Court's statement in McClendon concerning the "relief requested." Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 145 (1990).
87. 784 F. Supp. 1538, 1541 (D. Utah 1992).
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
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an employee who is wrongfully discharged by an employer seeking to avoid
paying pension benefits may not sue under state law, but may maintain a
claim under ERISA. However, the remedy available to such a plaintiff is limited by ERISA's exclusive remedy provision and thus does not allow an award
of punitive damages. 8 8

Like Roberts, the district courts in Sprague v. Generat Motors
Corp.89 and Pegg v. General Motors Corp.90 concluded that the
Supreme Court's dicta in McClendon was not meant as a suggestion
by the Court that an action under ERISA could be an action at law
with an attendant right to jury trial.91 In these two actions for payment of benefits, the courts concluded that it was clear that the relief
available under ERISA was strictly equitable in nature, 92 despite arguments made by the plaintiffs that their claims were actually legal.
In both Sprague and Pegg, the courts relied on the Sixth Circuit's
opinion in Bair v. General Motors Corp.93 to reach their conclusions
concerning the equitable nature of remedies available under ERISA.94
In Sprague, the court noted that in Bair it was held that an action for
ERISA benefits is "one at equity, not at law,"9 5 even where issues of
contract law were involved in the plaintiff's claims. This was in spite
of earlier language by the Supreme Court in Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch96 where the Court noted, that actions challenging a
denial of employment benefits prior to the enactment of ERISA were
governed by principles of contract law, 97 and that breach of contract
98
claims have traditionally been considered legal in nature.
Courts in post-McClendon cases involving claims for violation of
ERISA section 510 certainly have struggled with the interpretation of
the Court's dicta, but most recently have tended to conclude that no
right to a jury trial is provided. For example, in the Ninth Circuit's
recent Spinelli v. Gaughan9 9 decision, the court thoroughly considered
88. Id.
89. 804 F. Supp. 931 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (involving class action by retirees based upon
employer's reduction of health care benefits).
90. 793 F. Supp. 284 (D. Kan. 1992) (involving action under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) for
benefits due an employee).
91. Sprague v. General Motors Co., 804 F. Supp. 931, 936-37 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Pegg
v. General Motors Co., 793 F. Supp. 284, 285-86 (D. Kan. 1992).
92. Sprague v. General Motors Co., 804 F. Supp. 931, 937 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Pegg v.
General Motors Co., 793 F. Supp. 284, 286 (D. Kan. 1992).
93. 895 F.2d 1094 (6th Cir. 1990). The court in Bair expressly rejected an argument
by the plaintiff in that case that a jury trial right remains when relief is sought
under § 502(a)(1)(B) as opposed to § 502(a)(3). Id. at 1096.
94. Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 804 F. Supp. 931, 934-35 (E.D. Mich. 1992);
Pegg v. General Motors Corp., 793 F. Supp. 284, 286-87 (D. Kan. 1992).
95. Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 804 F. Supp. 931, 935 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
96. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
97. Id. at 112.
98. Id.
99. 12 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 1993).
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whether the plaintiff would have a right to trial by jury on her section
510 claim for wrongful discharge. Specifically, the court addressed
whether Supreme Court cases decided since McClendon clarify the
existence or non-existence of such a right.100 The Spinelli court concluded that the nature of the remedy provided by Congress in section
502 is solely equitable.'O' The court wrote that the language in the
statute is "clear enough,"102 but that the Supreme Court removed any
remaining doubt in its Mertens v. Hewitt AssociateslO3 decision.
In Mertens, the Supreme Court held that damages are not available for a violation of subsection 502(a)(3)1o 4 because the text of ERISA leaves no doubt that Congress intended that only traditional
forms of equitable relief be available. Mertens was not a section 510
case, but was a case brought by plan participants alleging that the
plan's actuary had caused losses. In analyzing the effect of Mertens,
the court in Spinelli noted:
Prior to Mertens, language at the very end ofIngersoll-RandCo. v. McClendon
could possibly have been read as allowing federal courts to award compensatory and punitive damages under section 5 02(a)(3), both of which are normally
considered legal remedies. We must deem this language, which was unnecessary to the result in Ingersoll-Randin any event, superseded by Mertens. 0 5

Although in Spinelli the court concluded that a section 510 claim
could be classified as legal in nature, the court ultimately held that
the nature of the remedy is more important than the nature of the
right in determining whether a right to jury trial existslO6 unless Congress lacked the power to limit the remedy available.107
The court found neither the Seventh AmendmentlOS nor other
Supreme Court jurisprudence to be a bar to Congress' creating a cause
of action for which only equitable relief is available.109 The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that Congress was attempting to transform an otherwise legal claim into an equitable one by statutory
fiat.11o The court concluded that the rights provided by Congress in
ERISA are not a mere "repackaging of existing rights."111 The court
wrote:
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 857 & n.3.
Id. at 857.
Id.
113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993).
Id. at 2064-65.
Spinelli v. Gaughan, 12 F.3d 853, 857 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
Id. at 857. The court further noted that the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated
that the nature of the remedy is dispositive when the two conflict. Id.

107. Id.
108. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 119-171 for a complete discussion of the
constitutional inquiry into a right to jury trial.
109. Spinelli v. Gaughan, 12 F.3d 853, 857-58 (9th Cir. 1993).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 857.
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The right of an employee not to be discharged for exercising rights under ERISA has no precursor under federal law; the Seventh Amendment does not
speak to whether a new cause of action must be legal or equitable. Insofar as
section 510 displaces existing rights available under state law-as it well
may-it does not merely relabel those rights by calling them equitable while
leaving in place their essentially legal character. By limiting the remedies1 1to2
those available in equity, Congress has changed what the dispute is about.

The result reached in Spinelli is directly contrary to McDonald v.
Artcraft Electric Supply Co.,1i3 an earlier decision from the District of
Columbia where a district court concluded that even if Congress had
intended to eliminate the right to a jury trial, it did not have the constitutional authority to do so.1 14 The court based its conclusion on the
plaintiff's desire for legal relief on his ERISA section 510 discharge
claim, as well as the fact-intensive nature of the dispute.115 In McDonald, the court stated that McClendon provided support for the
view that Congress intended to provide a right to trial by jury in ERISA cases seeking compensatory damages, as well as the view that a
6
jury trial was constitutionally mandated.1i
In light of the Supreme Court's holding in Mertens, however, the
court's conclusion in Spinelli is much more persuasive than the conclusion in McDonald.
Even assuming that subsection 502(a)(1)(B) may be used to enforce
section 510 and that McClendon does not suggest the exclusive use of
subsection 502(a)(3), not all courts agree that subsection 502(a)(1)(B)
actions are necessarily legal in nature."i 7 Further, even if some actions are legal in nature, that does not automatically require a finding
that Congress implicitly provided a right to jury trial.
In fact, the trend appears to be against finding a right to trial by
jury in the statute.ii 8 Because no right to a jury trial is implicitly or
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 857-58.
774 F. Supp. 29 (D.D.C. 1991).
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id. at 35.
For examples of cases holding that no right to a jury trial attaches under
§ 502(a)(1)(B), see Blake v. Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co. of Am., 906 F.2d
1525 (11th Cir. 1990); Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 894 F.2d 647 (3d Cir.) (Cox
II), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990); In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1982);
Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980); Wardle v. Central States, S.E.
& S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1112 (1981).
For examples of cases holding that a right to jury trial does exist, see
Gangitano v. NN Investors Life Ins. Co., 733 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Fla. 1990);
Stamps v. Michigan Teamsters Joint Council No. 43, 431 F. Supp. 745 (E.D.
Mich. 1977).
For opinions that have been interpreted to allow a jury trial depending on the
remedy requested, see Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1072 (1984); Steeples v. Time Ins. Co., 139 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Okla. 1991).
118. See, e.g., Spinelli v. Gaughan, 12 F.3d 853, 857-58 (9th Cir. 1993).
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explicitly provided for in an ERISA section 510 claim, courts cannot
avoid the Seventh Amendment constitutional issue.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."119
The United States Supreme Court has held that statutory rights created by Congress are included within the Seventh Amendment's
scope. 12 o The Seventh Amendment right to jury trial, however, applies only to suits in which legal rights are to be ascertained and not to
suits of equity or admiralty.121

Under present Seventh Amendment doctrine, a section 510 action
may be considered a common-law suit if it involves "rights and remedies of the sort typically enforced in an action at law."122 There are
four possible ways that rights and remedies might be paired in a statutory action.- 2 3
First, when legal rights are paired with legal remedies, the cause
of action is a pure action at law and the right to a jury trial attaches. 1 24 Second, when equitable rights are enforced by equitable
remedies, it is a pure equity suit and no right to a jury trial exists.'

25

Third, when legal rights are combined with an equitable remedy,
the cause of action is considered equitable and no right to a jury trial
arises.12 6 For example, in 1974 the United States Supreme Court distinguished Title VII claims from Title VIII claims and implied that
Title VII employment discrimination suits are not triable to a jury because even though the substantive right is legal, the remedy is equitable.127 Conversely, the Court held that Title VIII fair housing suits
were triable to a jury because Congress had provided both a legal right
and a legal remedy.128
Fourth, when equitable rights are combined with a legal remedy,
the outcome is the most difficult to predict. One publication has suggested that the suit should be considered equitable and that no right
119.
120.
121.
122.

U.S. Const. amend. VII.
See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974).
See id. at 193.
See id. at 195.

123. See Note, supra note 78, at 747.
124. See id.

125. See id.
126. See id. at 747-48. See also Spinelli v. Gaughan, 12 F.3d 853, 857-58 (9th Cir.
1993) (stating that where the nature of the remedy and the nature of the right
conflict, the equitable nature of the relief is dispositive).
127. See Note, supra note 78, at 747-48 (construing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189,
196-97 (1974)).
128. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974).
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to jury trial attaches.12 9 On the other hand, the United States
Supreme Court's current trend is to allow a right to jury trial whenever a legal remedy is present.130
In Ross v. Bernhard,131 the United States Supreme Courttenunciated a three-part test for determining whether the rights and'remedies of an action should be characterized as legal or equitable. The
test requires an examination of (1) the pre-merger custom with reference to the legal nature of the issue in question, (2) the nature of the
remedy sought, and (3) the practical abilities and limitations of a
jury.132 An ERISA action certainly seems to be within the practical
abilities and limitations of a jury.' 3 3 Consequently, the first two
prongs of the Ross test will determine if a right to jury trial attaches
under the Seventh Amendment: (1) whether an analogous pre-merger
cause of action was generally a legal or equitable claim, and (2)
whether the remedies available for a section 510 claim are equitable
or legal in nature.
A.

Pre-Merger Custom

The pre-merger custom prong of the Ross v. Bernhardtest examines the treatment of actions prior to the merger of law and equity
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The United States
Supreme Court has recognized that this examination requires "extensive and possibly abstruse historical inquiry."134 Despite Justice

129. See Note, supra note 78, at 748 (1983).
130. See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 57374 (1990); Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 n.4 (1989).
131. 396 U.S. 531 (1970), rev'g 403 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
132. Id. at 538 n.10.
133. Recently, the United States Supreme Court has focused on the first two parts of
the test. In fact, the United States Supreme Court has not used the practical
limitations of ajury as an independent basis for extending the right to a jury trial
under the Seventh Amendment. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 418 n.4
(1987), rev'g 769 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1985). In Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,
492 U.S. 33 (1989), the Court noted that this consideration is relevant when determining "whether Congress has permissibly entrusted the resolution of certain
disputes to an administrative agency or specialized court of equity, and whether
jury trials would impair the functioning of the legislative scheme." Id. at 42 n.4.
Even assuming the third prong of the test is still viable, ERISA § 510 actions
are within a jury's ability. There is nothing particularly difficult or cumbersome
in their resolution. Additionally, the resolution of such actions has not been entrusted to an administrative agency or specialized court of equity. The third
prong of the Bernhard test, therefore, does not play a role in this determination.
134. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970), rev'g 403 F.2d 909 (2d Cir.
1968).
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Brennan's call to "simplif" this prong of the test,' 35 the Court has
36
continued to look to pre-merger custom for guidance.
When Congress provides a statutory right, the inquiry can be even
more clifficult because no exactly analogous common-law right may
have e5dsted137 and courts generally disagree in their characterization
of statutory rights. Some courts have held that an ERISA section 510
action is most closely analogous to a breach of contract, wrongful discharge claim.138 The right may also be compared with the tort-based
public policy wrongful discharge claim.' 3 9 On the other hand, the
Third Circuit has stated that a section 510 claim might be analogous
to a tortious interference with benefits claim.140 Under these possibilities, the common-law analogue would either be a contract or tort
claim. Both were generally considered legal in nature if the remedy
sought was legal, but were considered equitable in nature if the rem-

edy sought was equitable.' 4 '

135. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 574-81
(1990) (Brennan, J., concurring).
136. See id. at 564-70, 581-91 (discussing and relying on the particular pre-merger
custom that the majority, concurring justice, and dissent believe is most relevant). See also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,418-21 (1990), reu'g 769 F.2d
182 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that the action is clearly analogous to the 18th century action in debt).
137. Pre-merger custom is not the only appropriate analogy. See infra text accompanying notes 138-146 for discussion of analogies to modem common-law claims.
138. See International Union v. Midland Steel Prod. Co., 771 F. Supp. 860, 863 (N.D.
Ohio 1991) (holding that the jury trial right is implicitly provided under the statute in addition to the right provided by the Seventh Amendment); Weber v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 751 F. Supp. 21, 25 (D. Conn. 1990) (finding that the right attaches
under the Seventh Amendment); Vicinanzo v. Brunschwig & Fils, Inc., 739 F.
Supp. 882, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding that ERISA implicitly provides the right
to a jury trial in addition to the right provided under the Seventh Amendment
involving mixed questions of law and fact).
139. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 136 (1990), reu'g 779
S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989) (holding that the state common-law action was preempted
by section 510, but recognizing the Texas Supreme Court had held that the claim
alleged could be brought as a public policy wrongful discharge action).
140. Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co. (Cox 11), 894 F.2d 647, 650 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 811 (1990). In Cox II, the court characterized a section 510 claim as one for
benefits under a plan. Id. Subsection 502(a)(1)(B)'s first clause-providing a
claimant with an action to recover benefits due under the terms of the planwould apply for enforcement, and no right to a jury trial would attach because
the claim is considered equitable in nature. Id. The court rejected the argument
that the second clause of § 502(a)(1)(B)-providing a claimant with an action to
enforce rights provided under the terms of the plan-applied, because there are
certain rights, as opposed to benefits, that can be provided under a plan separate
and distinct from the recovery of benefits. Id. The appeal process that must be
incorporated into the plan itself is an example of a right that would arise under
the plan. Id. Conversely, § 510 rights are not usually provided by a plan; the
rights arise under the Act. See id.
141. The split among courts trying to determine what statute of limitations applies to
an ERISA section 510 claim is a further indication of the disagreement that re-
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Beyond analogies to eighteenth century pre-merger actions, courts
may also consider whether the claim at issue is analogous to any common-law claim known today.142 In Spinelli v. Gaughan,i43 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals noted that analogizing to pre-merg4 claims
is not the only way to classify an action as legal or equitalgle. The
court found an appropriate analogy to the plaintiff's section 510 claim
in the modern tort of retaliatory discharge, "a tort so widely accepted
in American jurisdictions today [the court was] confident it has become part of our evolving common law."'44 The tort of retaliatory discharge is recognized as legal in nature. 45 As such, the court
considered Spinelli's claim to be legal, and avoided "rattling through
dusty attics of ancient writs"' 46 in search of an analogous pre-merger
claim.
Assuming no analogy to the right in question provides a clear answer, the second prong of the Ross v. Bernhardtest-the nature of the
remedy-will determine whether a Seventh Amendment jury trial
right exists. If the remedy available is legal in nature, then a right to
jury trial attaches. If the remedy is equitable, however, no right to a
jury trial arises under the Seventh Amendment.
B.

Nature of the Remedies

As discussed previously, subsection 502(a)(3) should be regarded
as the sole mechanism for enforcing a section 510 claim. 14 7 Subsection 502(a)(3)'s language clearly indicates that it applies to violations
of "this subchapter" or the terms of a plan.' 48 Subsection 502(a)(1)(B),
however, refers only to benefits or rights arising under the terms of a
plan.' 4 9 The jurisdictional mechanisms5O and remedial provisions151
suits when courts attempt to analogize section 510 claims to other claims. Some
courts have held that section 510 claims for benefits are contractual in nature;
therefore, the statute of limitations applied to contract claims in that state is
appropriate. See, e.g., Held v. Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d
1197, 1206-07 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that New York's six-year limitation period applied to an action for recovery of pension benefits).
Other courts, however, have held that section 510 claims are more analogous

to employment discrimination claims or wrongful discharge claims, and, thus, the
statute of limitations for those actions should apply. See, e.g., McClure v. Zoecon,
Inc., 936 F.2d 777, 778 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that section 510 proscribes spedfied acts of "discharge" and "discrimination").
142. See Spinelli v. Gaughan, 12 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1993).

143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id. at 857.
Id.
Id.

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See supra text accompanying notes 21-37.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988).
Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
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of each section indicate that Congress thought carefully about the language in each section and how that section would be used to enforce
rights under the Act. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court's
limits enforcement of secholding in Ingersoll-RandCo. v. McClendon
52
tion 51-0 claims to subsection 502(a)(3).1
Assuming that subsection 502(a)(3) is the only enforcement mechanism for section 510, the remedies available for a violation are plainly
limited to those that are equitable in nature. Subsection 502(a)(3)
provides that a violative act or practice may be enjoined or "other appropriate equitable relief" may be awarded.15 3 An injunction is
clearly an equitable remedy, and any other remedy available under
subsection 502(a)(3) has been specifically characterized as "equitable
relief." Based on the section's plain language regarding equitable relief, the Seventh Amendment does not provide a right to jury trial.
The United States Supreme Court, however, has not determined
conclusively what relief may be awarded when a section 510 plaintiff
prevails.1 54 Dicta in the McClendon case indicates that the Court
152. See supra text accompanying notes 32 & 65.
153. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988).

154. Other courts' awards have varied and included injunctive relief, backpay, reinstatement, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. See, e.g., Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 394 (3d Cir. 1988) (Cox I) (remanding case to
determine whether employee was entitled to the recovery of benefits under the
plan), appeal after remand, 894 F.2d 647 (Cox II), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811
(1990); International Union v. Midland Steel Prod. Co., 771 F. Supp. 860, 865
(N.D. Ohio 1991) (permitting a right to a jury trial to determine whether plaintiff
could recover compensatory damages and retirement health coverage benefits);
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Lewis, 753 F. Supp. 345, 347 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (recognizing recovery of "tort-like" damages); Weber v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 751 F. Supp. 21
(D. Conn. 1990) (allowing jury trial to determine whether plaintiff could recover
backpay, lost employee benefits, reinstatement, restoration of seniority, and compensatory damages); Vicinanzo v. Brunschwig & Fils, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 882, 883
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that in the absence of a stipulation by the parties, plaintiffs could have sued for a sum certain, and had they prevailed, they could have
recovered an indefinite number of subsequent judgments for future medical care);
Tucker v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 86-C-9734, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6737,
(N.D. IlM.July 17, 1987) (stating that only equitable relief is available, but not
defining what it intended to include as equitable relief); Brill v. Central States,
S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, No. 82-C-7973, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (N.D. I1M.
July 31, 1986) (stating that only equitable relief is available but including no
further definitions).
Recently, courts have almost uniformly held that punitive damages and other
extra-contractual damages are not available in actions for violations of ERISA
§ 510. See infra text accompanying notes 169-171.
The courts, however, have not agreed upon the base issue of whether or not
§ 502(a)(3) or 502(a)(1)(B) may be used to enforce a § 510 claim. If the courts had
agreed that only § 502(a)(3) applied, the plain language of that subsection makes
it difficult to see how they could award compensatory and punitive damages as
"other equitable relief." These cases, therefore, cannot be used to conclusively say
that the relief available for a § 510 claim is equitable or legal in nature.
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might allow legal relief even though the Court clearly indicated that
subsection 502(a)(3) is the appropriate enforcement mechanism for a
section 510 claim. 15 5 The McClendon dicta is in direct conflict with
subsection 502(a)(3)'s plain language, and the clear statutory language should prevail over one sentence of dicta in a preemption case
opinion.
If the Court were to determine that backpay awards are available
under subsection 502(a)(3), its recent Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 391 v. TerrylS6 decision would make the conclusion that
only equitable relief is available for a violation of section 510 somewhat more difficult, but not impossible. In Terry, the plaintiff to a
breach of the duty of fair representation claim requested "compensatory damages" in the form of "backpay and benefits."'157 The Court
distinguished the type of backpay at issue in Terry from other types of
equitable damages and held that it was legal in nature. 5 8
First, the Court stated that the benefits and backpay sought for the
breach of the duty of fair representation were not restitutionary in
nature. 15 9 The Court referenced actions for the disgorgement of improper profits as an example of restitution because the money in question was wrongfully withheld by the defendant.160 Te Court
distinguished the backpay at issue in Terry as money that would have
been received if the defendant had proceeded properly.161 Under this
distinction, backpay in an ERISA section 510 action might be more
like the backpay at issue in Terry because it is money that would have
been received if the defendant had acted properly-had not violated
1 62
the statute.
In Terry, however, the Court also distinguished backpay remedies
available under section 706(g) of Title VII from backpay remedies
available for a breach of the duty of fair representation.1 63 The Court
155. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 143 (1990), rev'g 779 S.W.2d 69
(Tex. 1989). See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
156. 494 U.S. 558 (1990).
157. Id. at 570.
158. Id. at 570-73.
159. Id. at 570-71.
160. Id. at 570.
161. Id. at 571.
162. In Terry, the Court also stated that "[a] monetary award 'incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief' may be equitable." Id. This seems to indicate that
if the primary goal of the case is to obtain an injunction and as part of the court's
injunctive powers it awards backpay, then the backpay award is equitable in
nature.
Given the Court's decision in Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 470-73
(1962), however, this characterization is not necessarily determinative. The right
to a jury trial cannot be abridged merely by characterizing the legal claim as
incidental to the equitable relief sought. See id. at 472-73 & n.8.
163. Chauffers, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 571-72 (1990).
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noted that Congress had specifically characterized backpay under Ti-

tle VII as a form of equitable relief.164 Although the Court limited the
scope of what might be characterized as restitutionary in nature, Title

VII remedies have been traditionally characterized as restitutionary

in natite' 6 5 even though they are not based on a wrongful withhold-

ing of money, like a disgorgement of profits. Rather, Title VII backpay
is money that would have been received if the defendant had acted
properly-had not violated the statute. This is the same characteriza-

tion applicable to backpay under ERISA. Therefore, the Court's distinction regarding what might be considered restitutionary is
somewhat confusing and not determinative of the issue.
The Court also made an interesting and important distinction between Title VIrs statutory language and the lack of similar language

in the NLRA or LMRA.166 Congress under Title VII specifically characterized backpay as a form of equitable relief.167 No such language
appears in the NLRA or LMRA. Like Title VII, ERISA subsection
502(a)(3) specifically characterizes the relief available for a section
510 claim as equitable.' 6 8 This similarity supports the conclusion
that if backpay is available under subsection 502(a)(3), it is equitable
rather than legal in nature.
The body of law concerning the availability of extra-contractual
damages in section 510 cases also supports the conclusion that the
relief available in a section 510 claim is equitable. Litigated almost as
regularly as the right to jury trial issue, the availability of punitive
damages and damages for emotional distress has also provided an
area of contention for the courts.' 6 9 It has recently become clear, how164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 572.
Id.
Id. at 572-73.
Id. at 572.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988).
Prior to the decision in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990),
rev'g 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989), every circuit court that had addressed the issue
had held that punitive damages are not recoverable under ERISA § 502(a)(3).
See Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651, 661 (7th Cir.) (citing Kleinhans v. Lisle
Say. Profit Sharing Trust, 810 F.2d 618, 627 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 61 (1992); Amos v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 868 F.2d 430 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 855 (1989); Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1989);
Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 488
U.S. 909 (1988); Varhala v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 1987); Sommers Drug
Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enter., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456
(5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034, and cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1089
(1987); Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1986); Powell v. Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co., 780 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986).
These and other decisions holding that extra-contractual damages were not available under ERISA § 502(a)(3) grew out of the Supreme Court's holding in Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985), rev'g 722 F.2d
482 (9th Cir. 1983), that "extra-contractual damages caused by improper or un-
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ever, that the weight of authority lies against the awarding of punitive
and other extra-contractual damages to section 510 plaintiffs.170
Courts reaching this conclusion have generally done so based on the
equitable nature of the remedies intended by Congress.171 ",
Because section 510 claims are enforced under subsection
502(a)(3), the plain language of that section and similarity to Title VII
indicate that no right to a jury trial attaches under the Seventh
Amendment.
IV.

CONCLUSION

ERISA provides no explicit right to a jury trial for section 510
claims, either in section 510 or in its enforcement statute, ERISA subsection 502(a). In addition, because ERISA's plain language indicates
that section 510 actions should be brought only under subsection
502(a)(3), which provides only equitable relief, no implicit right to a
jury trial exists and no Seventh Amendment right to a jury attaches.
Subsection 503(a)(1)(B) should not be considered an enforcement
mechanism.
Although the right to a jury trial in ERISA section 510 cases continues to be an area of contention for the lower federal courts, recent
decisions such as Spinelli v. Gaughan172 and Mertens v. Hewitt A4ssociates1 73 have begun to clear the murkiness created by the Supreme
Court's unfortunate dicta in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon.74 Perhaps the time has come when ERISA litigants will be able to avoid
rehashing the same arguments regarding the existence of a right to
jury trial, and both courts and litigants will accept the premise that
the equitable nature of remedies provided in ERISA subsection
502(a)(3) results in trials to the courts on section 510 claims.
The right to a jury trial is an important constitutionally protected
right. If, however, as this Article concludes, Congress has only provided for equitable relief, the section 510 action falls outside the Sevtimely processing of benefit claims" were not recoverable in an action brought by

a beneficiary under ERISA § 409(a), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
170. See, e.g., Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651, 661 (7th Cir.), cert.denied, 113 S. Ct.

171.

172.
173.
174.

61 (1992); McRae v. Seafarers' Welfare Plan, 920 F.2d 819, 821 (11th Cir.), rev'g
726 F. Supp. 817 (S.D. Ala. 1989), reh'g denied, 931 F.2d 901 (1991); Roberts v.
Thorn Apple Valley, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 1538, 1541 (D. Utah 1992); O'Neil v.
Gencorp, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 833, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Gaskell v. Harvard Co-op.
Soc'y, 762 F. Supp. 1539, 1544 (D. Mass. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 3 F.3d
495 (1st Cir. 1993).
See supra text accompanying notes 85-88 for a discussion of the decision in Roberts v. Thorn Apple Valley, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 1538 (D. Utah 1992) in which the
court thoroughly considered the punitive damages issue.
12 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 1993).
113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993).
498 U.S. 133 (1990).
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enth Amendment and no right that might need protection exists.
Congress constructed the ERISA enforcement provisions with great
care. Much thought went into the overall enforcement scheme. The
statute should be read literally, and if Congress believes a different
result 's warranted, it may act to change the enforcement scheme it
created.'

